Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:40:24am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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D03: Tax Treaties and Cross-Border Profit Shifting Location: Room 103 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Bilateral Tax Treaties, Tax Sparing and Cross-Border Banking Rennes School of Business, France This paper shows that the effects of bilateral tax treaties (BTTs) on international banking in developing countries depend critically on treaty design. Using bilateral banking loan data from the Bank for International Settlements matched with newly assembled information on treaty provisions, we find that BTTs have no average effect on cross-border lending, consistent with existing evidence for foreign direct investment. However, this aggregate null masks strong and economically meaningful heterogeneity. BTTs that include tax sparing provisions significantly increase cross-border loans to both banks and non-bank borrowers, while regular BTTs without tax sparing reduce interbank lending and have little impact on lending to non-banks. These patterns suggest that tax sparing preserves host-country tax incentives and stimulates international credit, whereas information exchange provisions constrain tax-motivated financial activity. Overall, the results demonstrate that treaty design, not treaty existence, shapes cross-border banking between developed and developing economies.
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