Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:34am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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E15: Citizens and the State: Compliance, Support, and Exit Location: Room 118 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Violence and secessionism Mainz University, Germany In several cases secessionism goes together with violence. This paper uses a dynamic model to discuss the incentives of moderates and extremists, both agitating for independence. The extremists are willing to conduct terror and I argue that there are two types of extremists, those who are willing to compromise, and those who are not. In the equilibrium of the model, the moderates have a larger incentive to suppress terror and the extremists who are willing to compromise have smaller incentives to conduct terror when the probability of reaching an agreement is higher. The extremists who are not willing to compromise, however, have larger incentives to conduct terror when the probability of reaching an agreement is high.
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