Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
Please select a date to show only sessions at that day. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:40:23am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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A15: Size-Based Tax Incentives and Firm Investment Location: Room 118 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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The Hidden Costs of Tax Incentive Take-up 1: Shanghai University of International Business and Economics; 2: Xi’an Jiaotong University This paper investigates the drivers of imperfect take-up by exploiting a threshold-based corporate tax cut targeting small firms in China. Using comprehensive administrative data, we document the striking puzzle that only 45 percent of eligible firms claim tax benefits. We employ a fuzzy regression discontinuity design and find that claiming the tax relief significantly increases external tax consulting costs. These costs act as a hidden “entry fee” that deters small firms from participating in even straightforward rate-cut policies. We further rule out audit risk and administrative approval barriers as alternative mechanisms. Despite this compliance friction, we find that for participating firms, the tax savings relax financial constraints, leading to a significant increase in investment in eligible fixed assets. Our findings highlight that reliance on paid intermediaries severely limits the transmission of tax policy to small businesses.
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