Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:38:52am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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B03: Optimal Redistribution and Labour Supply Location: Room 103 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Optimal Income Taxation with Endogenous Wages, Extensive-Margin Labor Supply, and Profit-Share Heterogeneity 1: Waseda University, Japan; 2: Meiji Gakuin University, Japan This paper studies optimal income taxation with endogenous wages and extensive-margin labor supply, focusing on how production structure and profit-share heterogeneity shape optimal tax policy. We show that if the production function exhibits CRS, profit is fully taxed, or profit shares are uncorrelated with social marginal welfare weights, the classic extensive-margin optimal tax rule continues to hold despite endogenous wages. By contrast, under DRS without full profit taxation and with heterogeneous profit shares, the optimal rule must incorporate general equilibrium effects operating through both wages and profits. Numerical simulations based on generalized CES production functions indicate that negative employment tax rates are often optimal for low-income workers, and that redistribution strengthens as decreasing returns become more pronounced and profit shares become more unequal. Overall, optimal employment tax design depends not only on wage inequality and labor supply responses, but also on the distribution of profit shares across worker types.
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