Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:38:26am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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C14: Optimal Taxation and Subsidy Design: Theory Location: Room 116 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Optimal Nonlinear Deployment Subsidies: Theory and Application to the German Solar Program Sciences Po, France Deployment subsidies for nascent technologies have moved to the forefront of climate action, industrial policy, and geoeconomics. To limit the substantial fiscal costs of such programs, policymakers routinely employ subsidy schedules that are nonlinear in the quantity agents deploy. However, nonlinearities can threaten a program's deployment goals because agents may respond to them at the intensive margin by reducing deployed quantity and at the extensive margin by ceasing participation. This paper characterizes optimal nonlinear subsidy schemes in which a principal trades off the benefits from deployment with its budgetary costs. Theoretically, it shows that nonlinearities are optimal only if adopters' participation responses are heterogeneous along the subsidy schedule. Yet, early-stage technologies typically exhibit limited heterogeneity in this dimension. As a consequence, the optimal subsidy rate is close to constant over a wide range of the schedule. A quantitative analysis of the canonical German rooftop-solar program demonstrates the theoretical findings.
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