Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:16am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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G11: Fiscal Rules, Tax Expenditures, and Sovereign Risk Location: Room 112 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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"Can Fiscal Rules Stringency Curb Corruption In Developing Countries ?" Erudite - Université Paris-Est Créteil, France This study investigates the impact of fiscal rule stringency on political corruption in developing countries. Using a panel of 108 countries over the period 1997–2020 and applying the Entropy-IV method, the results indicate that greater fiscal rule stringency significantly reduces corruption. This effect, which remains robust across several specifications, suggests that rule-based frameworks can generate side effects beyond their initial objective of mitigating deficit bias. The analysis also reveals that the impact of fiscal rule stringency is primarily observed in upper-middle-income countries and in contexts where executive power faces moderate institutional constraints. Moreover, we identify a threshold effect, indicating that while increasing stringency initially reduces corruption, excessively rigid fiscal rules may become counterproductive. Overall, these results suggest that what matters most is not the mere adoption of fiscal rules, but their design, credibility, and appropriate level of stringency.
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