Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:38:26am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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E07: Tax Incidence, Pass-Through, and Price Salience Location: Room 107 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Investor Valuations of Inattention Rents 1: Drexel University, United States of America; 2: Hebrew University, Israel Despite widespread evidence of consumer inattention and salience effects on prices and consumer demand, little is known about the degree to which “drip” pricing contributes to firm profitability. In this paper, we study investor reactions to several regulatory, legislative, and litigation events intended to limit drip pricing in order to quantify “inattention rents.” Inattention rents differ from ordinary economic rents in that they may even arise in perfectly competitive markets where consumers suffer from inattention. Mitigating inattention (e.g., by requiring advertised prices to be tax and fee inclusive) results in a transfer of surplus from producers to consumers while curbing overconsumption. The announcement of final rules requiring airlines to advertise tax-inclusive prices in the U.S. imply 3-day cumulative abnormal returns of -4% among domestic U.S. carriers, whereas foreign carriers were minimally affected. Proposed legislation related to other forms of drip pricing and targeted litigation have more muted effects.
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