Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:38:04am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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F08: Optimal Taxation: Public Goods and Income Tax Design Location: Room 108 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Lifetime Versus Period Taxation With Optimal Non-Linear Taxes Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands The idea of lifetime taxation was introduced by Vickrey (1939) because fluctuating incomes are taxed more than constant flows of income under progressive taxation. In this paper I put this idea in a Mirrleesian framework of optimal non-linear taxation to evaluate whether taxation of lifetime income improves social welfare compared to period taxation. Optimal non-linear taxes for period and lifetime taxation are derived using the perturbation approach. A simple two-period model with an exogenous two-dimensional heterogeneity in ability is used to study the equity-efficiency trade-off under lifetime taxation. I find that, for standard social-welfare functions, the idea of Vickrey (1939) no longer holds with optimal non-linear taxes, since marginal taxes tend to be declining in income. The resulting optimal period tax is close to linear in income, which implies equal taxes conditional on lifetime income. This explains why gains of moving to lifetime taxation in the numerical simulation are small.
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