Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:36:56am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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B03: Optimal Redistribution and Labour Supply Location: Room 103 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Designing Redistribution With Endogenous Transfer Take-up 1: IFAU, Sweden; 2: Uppsala University, Sweden; 3: LMU Munich, Germany; 4: ifo Institute, Germany The optimal tax literature ignores that, across the world, redistribution towards the poor mainly happens via welfare transfers with take-up rates far below 100%. This paper provides the first comprehensive analysis of tax-transfer systems composed of mandatory income taxes and optional transfer programs. We develop a theoretical model that (a) allows for heterogeneity in productivity and take-up costs and (b) accounts for responses at the take-up margin and both margins of labor supply. We derive empirically applicable formulas that specify (i) conditions for the existence of Pareto-improving reforms of taxes, transfers, or both, (ii) the inverse optimum weights of transfer recipients and non-recipients that make an observed safety net optimal, (iii) the optimal tax rates and transfer phase-out rates. We apply these formulas to show that the tax-transfer system of Germany and Sweden are inefficient: There exist transfer reforms that make all recipients better off while increasing net tax revenue.
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