Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:38:47am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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B02: Optimal Capital, Wealth, and Entrepreneurial Taxation Location: Room 102 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Optimal Taxation of Risky Capital Erasmus University Rotterdam, Netherlands, The We consider the optimal taxation of capital if government is allowed to differentiate taxes on the basis of an asset’s risk class. We separately consider wealth taxes and the joint taxation of both wealth and capital income. We find that taxes on normal returns (be it wealth or income taxes) should be higher for risk-bearing assets if individual risk aversion is declining with earnings ability. We show that the insurance motive to tax excess returns to risky assets does not interfere with the redistributional motive to differentiate taxes on normal returns. However, a tax on excess returns is shown to also have a redistributive role in our setting, as long as taxes on normal returns are differentiated.
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