Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:38:48am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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B04: Tax Competition Location: Room 104 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Tax Competition Networks 1: ZEW & Universität Münster, Germany; 2: ZEW & Universität Mannheim, Germany How do policies spread across jurisdictions when policymakers respond to potential competitors idiosyncratically? We develop a new approach to measuring network ties from policymakers’ revealed references and apply it to local business taxation in Germany. Using 3,982 policy narratives from 3,129 tax reform debates, we show that local politicians selectively invoke peer jurisdictions, with references varying by shared municipal characteristics and political ideology. We use these patterns to predict the network of policy interactions across Germany’s municipalities and combine it with plausibly exogenous tax reforms in selected municipalities to study tax competition. Tax changes propagate substantially through this network, including across state borders, with approximately 22 percent of an initial tax shock transmitted to exposed municipalities. These effects are larger than those found in previous studies using generic network structures, helping to reconcile conflicting evidence on the extent of local tax competition.
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