Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:40:19am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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C03: Digital Economy Taxation and International Tax Allocation Location: Room 103 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Fair and Efficient Division of Profit Tax Revenues 1: University of Cambridge, United Kingdom; 2: Max Planck, Munich Profits are often created from activities across multiple jurisdictions. What is the optimal division of tax revenues across these jurisdictions? This paper addresses this question theoretically and empirically. First, we propose a new welfare function for fair division of profit tax revenues across jurisdictions, where jurisdictions' claims to revenue depend on how much of multinational corporations' capital, labour and sales are located within the jurisdiction. Second, we show how this theory can be applied to the optimal division of revenues when taxation distorts location decisions of corporate activities. Third, to speak to the extent of location responses, we exploit data on multinational corporations in the EU to estimate the current distribution of activities and the responsiveness of each activity to tax rate differentials. Fourth, using these results, we simulate optimal divisions of revenues for the EU under formula apportionment.
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