Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:06:33am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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E14: Profit Shifting, Tax Havens, and Cross-Border Financial Flows Location: Room 116 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Asymmetric Tax Competition With Fixed Costs of Profit Shifting University of Goettingen, Germany This paper studies how fixed costs of profit shifting shape international tax competition. We set up a formal model with two asymmetric countries: a non-haven country where a representative firm conducts its economic activity and a tax haven. The firm can allocate its profits to the tax haven, which incurs both fixed and variable costs. The presence of fixed costs creates an additional incentive for the non-haven country to reduce its tax rate in order to prevent profit shifting. We show that this can intensify tax competition and ultimately harm both countries, while being beneficial for the firm. Our results suggest that taking fixed costs into account significantly alters the nature of tax competition. This has implications for international measures to curb profit shifting activities, revealing potential adverse effects.
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