Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:37:15am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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E11: Optimal Pension System Design and Ageing Location: Room 112 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Optimal Pension System Design Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Sweden This paper studies the efficiency cost of pay-as-you-go pension systems. The return on contributions in such a system is typically average income growth rather than the market return on capital. Because the gap between these returns compounds over the life cycle, early-career contributions have a higher implicit tax rate. I develop a sufficient-statistics framework in which the deadweight loss depends on the age profile of implicit tax rates. Deadweight loss is minimized when the implicit tax rate is constant, mirroring the logic of tax smoothing. I propose an implementation within a notional defined contribution design: contributions are valorized at a higher, market-based rate of return, while only a fraction of contributions is credited to notional accounts and the remainder treated as a pure tax. Finally, I compare pension systems in terms of deadweight loss. The results show real but small gains from pension reform.
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