Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:37:14am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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E15: Citizens and the State: Compliance, Support, and Exit Location: Room 118 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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When (Declaring) Work Doesn't Pay: An Experiment with Welfare Recipients 1: ifo institute, Germany; 2: University of Erlangen-Nuremberg; 3: IAB; 4: University of Salzburg; 5: LMU We study how marginal effective tax rates of means-tested social welfare programs affect labor supply in the formal and informal sector. In a conjoint experiment, German welfare recipients report which jobs they might accept under different policy scenarios, varied in a between-subjects treatment design. We find that in addition to their negative effect on labor supply in the formal sector, higher transfer withdrawal rates increase the probability that job offers in the informal sector are accepted. These results provide novel evidence on the adverse implications of high transfer withdrawal rates and highlight the need for reform initiatives aiming at stronger labor supply incentives.
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