Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:15am WEST
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B14: Collecting Taxes: Administration, Politics, and Enforcement Location: Room 116 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Does Intermunicipal Cooperation Decrease Property Tax Gap? Evidence from Italy. 1: Department of Economics, Università degli Studi di Ferrara, Italy; 2: Department of Economics, Università di Roma La Sapienza, Italy Inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) offers the scale economies of larger jurisdictions while preserving local political autonomy, yet the literature has assessed it almost entirely through expenditure efficiency, overlooking state capacity and tax enforcement. We investigate whether pooling administrative functions through IMC reduces the municipal property tax gap in Italy. Using official tax gap estimates and an Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW) approach, we find significant heterogeneity. In the Center-South, where administrative capacity is lower, cooperation on core fiscal-administrative functions is associated with an approximately 6.3 percentage-point reduction in the tax gap, consistent with a catch-up mechanism. Conversely, the marginal effect in the more compliant North is statistically zero. A counterfactual simulation estimates that extending cooperation to untreated municipalities in the Center-South could recover approximately 290 million EUR annually. These findings highlight the value of targeted incentives aimed at low-capacity jurisdictions, where the potential to strengthen enforcement and maximize revenue recovery is highest.
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