Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:37:44am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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C05: Property Taxation: Design, Incentives, and Housing Location: Room 105 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Political Incentives In Local Tax Setting: Evidence From The German Property Tax Reform 1: Friedrich-Alexander Universität, Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany; 2: Friedrich-Alexander Universität, Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany; CESifo Research Network Fellow Local governments may use tax-setting discretion strategically when politicians perceive tax burdens to fall differently across voter groups. We study this mechanism in the context of Germany’s property tax reform, which created exogenous variation in expected tax burdens across municipalities and voter groups through different state-level valuation models. In some states, standardized valuations implied a higher tax base for rental properties than for comparable owner-occupied units. We examine whether property tax multipliers increased more after reform details were announced when municipalities were governed by homeowner-friendly parties and located in states where tenants would face higher tax bases. Using a triple difference-in-differences design and panel data from 3,769 West German municipalities between 2017 and 2024, we find evidence consistent with strategic tax adjustments. Our results provide causal evidence on the political determinants of recent increases in German property tax multipliers.
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