Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:39am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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G13: Tax Transparency, Revolving Doors, and Cryptocurrency Location: Room 114 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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From Tax Authority to Tax Advisor: Revolving Doors and the Market for Fiscal Expertise 1: Institute for Social Research, Norway; 2: VATT Institute for Economic Research This paper studies whether revolving-door moves from the tax administration to the private sector create private surplus for firms and rents for workers. Using linked administrative employer–employee data from Norway and Finland, we track hires of former tax-administration employees and outcomes for both hiring firms and movers. Firm-level event studies show that tax payments decline after a hire. Worker-level event-study difference-in-differences designs show sharp wage increases at the transition. We use a triple-difference specification isolates the premium specific to tax-administration-to-private moves from general job-switch wage gains. The results suggest that enforcement-specific know-how is tradable. Firms’ tax payments drop after acquiring this expertise, and workers capture part of the surplus through higher wages. We interpret the findings through a framework that distinguishes compliance-capital from avoidance-capital, with welfare implications ranging from reduced administrative frictions to revenue displacement and distorted competition
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