Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:06:34am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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A09: Sovereign Debt Restructuring and Default Location: Room 109 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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A Fiscal Common Pool Model of Public Debt in The Presence of A Debt-Related Crisis 1: National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Japan; 2: Konan University, Japan This paper extends the fiscal common pool model of public debt to include an economic crisis triggered by fiscal deficit. We consider a fragmented government in a two-period model. Interest groups determine government spending in the first period. The fiscal deficit is financed by public debts, the redemption cost of which is equally shared among groups in the second period. Our extension is that there are two states of the world in the second period: crisis state and normal state. Regarding the relationship between public debt issued and the crisis probability, we consider three scenarios: zero-risk, low-risk, and high-risk scenarios. We show that in the high-risk scenario, three cases can arise: unique corner equilibrium (zero debt issuance), unique interior equilibrium (positive issuance) and multiple equilibria. We further show that as the number of interest groups increases, the combinations of economic growth and crisis losses that lead to multiple equilibria expand.
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