Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:40:23am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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G13: Tax Transparency, Revolving Doors, and Cryptocurrency Location: Room 114 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Comparing the Effectiveness of Anti-BEPS Measures: Evidence from Austrian Tax Returns WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Austria Using Austrian administrative corporate tax return data, we examine how MNEs respond to three major anti-base erosion and profit shifting (anti-BEPS) policies: (i) interest and royalty deduction limitations, (ii) private Country-by-Country Reporting (CbCR), and (iii) controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules. We find that limits on interest and royalty deductions curb income shifting out of Austria, with little evidence that exposed MNE entities substitute into alternative shifting channels. In contrast, private CbCR largely offsets these effects, while also incentivizing MNEs to increase economic activity in foreign low-tax affiliates. Exposure to the CFC rule similarly leads MNEs to increase economic activity abroad and continue income shifting, consistent with efforts to qualify for active-income safe harbors under the Austrian regime. Overall, our evidence suggests that anti-BEPS measures have nuanced effects. Some measures effectively constrain income shifting, whereas others primarily induce real economic responses without reducing the extent of income shifting.
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