Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:38:52am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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F10: Tax Avoidance: Earnings Management and Firm Behaviour Location: Room 110 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Tax-motivated firm splitting Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Sweden How do corporate tax systems shape firm boundaries? This paper shows that nonlinear corporate income taxation (CIT) can distort firms’ organizational structures by inducing tax‐motivated firm splitting. I use administrative data on corporations and their owners and exploit two reforms that altered the tax benefits and costs of dividing a firm into multiple entities. I find that a temporary increase in the tax advantage of splitting reduces the share of firms filing jointly for CIT purposes. Once the benefit is perceived as permanent and minimum capital requirements for new firms are abolished, the number of firms per entrepreneur rises significantly and persistently. Reorganizations are primarily driven by tax motives, as I find no effect on firms' total assets, employment, or industry diversification. These findings highlight extensive-margin responses of business organization to corporate taxation, with relevant implications for the understanding of firm dynamics and for tax design.
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