Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:33am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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F13: Optimal Income Taxation: New Directions Location: Room 114 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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The Taxation Of Couples: A Tax Perturbation Approach 1: University of St. Gallen, Switzerland; 2: KU Leuven, Belgium This paper characterizes the optimal degree of jointness in the taxation of married couples. We develop a tax-perturbation framework to analyze reforms that vary the degree of jointness, decomposing their efficiency effects into a tagging gain from conditioning taxes on spousal earnings and a distortion arising because those earnings are endogenous. Our main theoretical result shows that, starting from a separable, revenue-maximizing (Rawlsian) tax schedule, introducing negative jointness—where marginal tax rates decrease with spousal earnings—increases tax revenue under a mild regularity condition satisfied by a broad class of empirically relevant joint income distributions. More generally, positive jointness is optimal only if the planner places sufficiently high welfare weight on rich couples with unequal earnings. Using U.S. data on married couples, we find that the globally optimal tax schedule raises the revenue-maximizing lump-sum transfer by about 3% relative to individual taxation, redirecting redistribution toward the poorest couples.
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