Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:37:44am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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D14: Elections, Political Connections, and Offshore Finance Location: Room 116 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Elections and Offshore Deposits: Evidence from Close Electoral Turnpvers KU Eichstätt, Germany Do electoral turnovers discipline offshore finance by raising (expected) accountability and scrutiny? Using bilateral quarterly BIS data on cross-border offshore bank deposits, we study whether national power transitions triggered by elections, particularly narrowly decided turnovers, affect offshore bank deposits. Electoral turnovers generate theoretically ambiguous effects. Increased enforcement expectations may reduce offshore deposits, while precautionary capital flight or rent extraction may increase them. Using a regression discontinuity design and a difference-in-differences analysis, we show that offshore deposits decline by 10 percent following close electoral turnovers. The effect is consistent with an accountability mechanism, suggesting that new governments raise (expected) enforcement and scrutiny and induce wealthy and politically exposed individuals to reduce offshore deposits. These findings demonstrate that political transitions can reshape private portfolio decisions in opaque jurisdictions, even in the absence of new transparency reforms.
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