Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:38:47am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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E04: Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Equalisation Location: Room 104 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Weak Versus Strong Enforcement Of Federal Standards University of Mannheim, Germany Spillovers across regions provide strong incentives to coordinate policy or even to centralize it in a federation. I study the feasibility of federalization of policy when the decision of regions over the introduction of a federal standard is endogenized and the choice of the specific standard is separated in time from the decision over having a federal standard. The latter severely limits policy coordination. Moreover, I consider the case in which at a cost a region may choose to not comply with the federal standard (weak enforcement). While weak enforcement may hamper policy coordination in some situations, it may also enable it when rules cannot be fully enforced. I then interpret the introduction, the various reforms and the massive violations of the EU's Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in light of the theory.
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