Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
Please select a date to show only sessions at that day. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
Activate "Show Presentations" and enter your name in the search field in order to find your function (s), like presenter, discussant, chair.
Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:38:47am WEST
|
Daily Overview |
| Session | |
|
E12: Third-Party Reporting, Audit Targeting, and Non-Filing Location: Room 113 (Francesinhas 1) | |
    | |
Income Tax Frequency University of Bordeaux, France This paper studies whether the timing of income taxation affects welfare when earnings fluctuate within the year. Standard tax systems assess liabilities annually, implicitly treating taxpayers with the same yearly income as equivalent, even if one earns smoothly while another faces sharp monthly swings. We develop a theoretical framework showing that, under a convex tax schedule, shifting from annual to monthly tax adjustment, holding total yearly tax constant, is improving when income is nondecreasing and reduces liquidity risk. We compare two within-year regimes: Vickrey’s cumulative averaging rule and a new Monthly Compensated (MC) mechanism based on uniform rescaling of monthly tax liabilities. Using monthly data from the U.S. Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), we simulate welfare effects. Income volatility is concentrated at the bottom and linked to employment transitions. The MC system yields substantial gains for low-income, high-volatility individuals across states, while Vickrey delivers smaller but positive gains.
| |
