Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:33am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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A13: Unemployment Insurance and the Safety Net: Design, Spillovers, and Integrity Location: Room 114 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Introducing Flexicurity: Labor Market Effects of an Unemployment Insurance Reform and Severance Pay 1: RWI, Germany; 2: TU Dortmund, Germany; 3: Lietuvos Bankas, Lithuania; 4: WZB, Germany; 5: IZA, Germany; 6: Vilnius University, Lithuania; 7: CESifo, Germany In July 2017, Lithuania moved toward flexicurity by significantly increasing the generosity of unemployment insurance (UI) while simultaneously decreasing firing costs. We use administrative data on all Lithuanian workers to quantify labor market effects of i) the reform, which increased the potential benefit duration and the monthly benefit level by 50 percent, and ii) variation in severance pay. We find that the elasticity of the non-employment duration w.r.t. a proportional increase in both policy parameters is 0.4, and the elasticity of the benefit duration is 0.7, suggesting a substantial fiscal cost. Finally, we find little evidence for a reform effect on re-employment wages.
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