Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:38:48am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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G06: Household Economics: Marriage, Divorce and Retirement Location: Room 106 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Retirement After Divorce: A Life-Cycle Model of Pensions, Divorce and Retirement 1: University of Copenhagen, Denmark; 2: University of Oxford Over the past two decades, the likelihood of divorce after age 50 has doubled. Grey divorce therefore increasingly occurs when pension wealth constitutes a large share of household resources and gender gaps are substantial. Cross-country differences in pension division raise the question of how well individuals are insured against its consequences. Using Danish administrative data, we show that divorce is associated with delayed retirement, especially for women. We then develop a structural model of household bargaining, divorce, saving, and retirement to study how divorcees insure consumption and how these margins interact with pension-division policies. We find that compensating pension wealth differences through liquid assets has little effect on divorced women’s retirement because it is used to smooth consumption around divorce. By contrast, in-kind pension division leads divorced women to retire earlier. When public pensions are means tested, it also reduces their reliance on public benefits by raising private pension income.
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