Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:38:47am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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E02: Pension Design and Retirement Incentives Location: Room 102 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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The Impact of Social Security Eligibility and Pension Wealth on Retirement University of Copenhagen, Denmark I study a Danish reform that links social security eligibility to life expectancy and postpones eligibility for some cohorts. Exact birth-date cutoffs create discontinuities that identify causal effects. Using administrative records linked to a survey on retirement expectations, I estimate that a six-month delay raises labor force participation by about 20 percentage points three months after the cutoff, with much larger effects among individuals with low occupational pension wealth. I measure treatment intensity by computing average social security payments during the six-month ineligibility window. These payments fall only modestly across the pension-wealth distribution, so differential incidence explains only part of the gradient. Scaling reduced-form effects by group-specific social security wealth, I find that low-wealth individuals remain more responsive per euro of foregone benefits. Delaying eligibility by half a year yields a net fiscal gain of about EUR 8.4k per affected individual, concentrated among low-wealth groups.
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