Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:37:39am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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C15: Retirement, Saving, and Disability Insurance Location: Room 118 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Partial Disability Insurance 1: University of Copenhagen; 2: Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) To curb the rising costs of disability insurance (DI) programs, some countries have implemented partial DI programs, which require recipients to work part time to receive benefits. However, the welfare implications of such programs remain unclear. The analysis in this paper is twofold. First, we introduce a conceptual framework that identifies the central tradeoffs between partial DI programs, full DI programs, and ordinary employment. Second, we study a reform in Denmark that expanded the Danish partial DI program. We find that the reform substantially altered selection into the program by shifting individuals who would otherwise have entered the full DI program into the partial DI program. At the same time, we find no evidence of negative selection from ordinary employment. However, existing partial DI participants work fewer hours when starting new spells, suggesting that imperfect screening entails efficiency costs.
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