Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
Please select a date to show only sessions at that day. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:36:56am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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E03: Elections, Representation, and Accountability Location: Room 103 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Information and the Politics of School Quality: Evidence from a Nationwide Reform in Brazil 1: Amazon; 2: Masaryk University; 3: University of British Columbia; 4: Nova School of Business and Economics We use the introduction of a school-level accountability system in Brazil to estimate the effects of public information on school quality. Reports revealing that schools are high in the test score distribution increase the incumbent mayor's vote share by about 2 percentage points. The revelation of low scores reduces incumbent mayor vote share by roughly the same margin, but also causes decreased class sizes and pupil-teacher ratios in subsequent years. These effects are larger in places with more educated voters.
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