Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:16am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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D08: Corrective and Commodity Taxation Location: Room 108 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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First‑Best and Second‑Best Commodity Taxation under Monopolistic Competition with Free Entry Takushoku University, Japan This paper develops a general equilibrium model of commodity taxation under monopolistic competition with free entry. Extending the Dixit–Stiglitz framework, we allow the government to use both ad valorem and specific taxes and to rebate tax revenue in a lump-sum manner. We show that ad valorem taxation alone can implement the first-best allocation by correcting both markup and entry distortions, rendering specific taxes redundant. The optimal ad valorem tax schedule reverses the Ramsey rule: industries with higher price elasticities of demand face higher tax rates. This reversal arises because taxation affects firms’ entry incentives in addition to consumption choices. When ad valorem taxes are constrained, specific taxes serve only as second-best instruments and equilibrium entry becomes excessive in every industry. The results highlight that instrument choice is central to optimal taxation in imperfectly competitive economies.
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