Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:38:47am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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E14: Profit Shifting, Tax Havens, and Cross-Border Financial Flows Location: Room 116 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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The Beauty of Grey: Bank Transfers and Anti-Money Laundering Provisions 1: University College Dublin, Ireland Skatteforsk, Norwegian Centre for Tax Research; 2: Skatteforsk, Norwegian Centre for Tax Research; 3: Norwegian University of Life Sciences International bank transfers are the lifeblood of the global economy, funding trade and investment, but they can also conceal profit shifting and illicit activity. Multilateral efforts to grey-list worrisome countries aim to curb such flows, yet evidence of their effectiveness remains limited—perhaps because it relies on aggregate data dominated by unaffected, legal transactions. Using unique granular data from Norway (2012–2021), we likewise find no significant relationship for the average grey-listing effect. Even in the aggregate, however, inbound transfers from listed tax havens are markedly lower, and decomposing by purpose reveals that import payments, interest, and dividends—especially to tax havens—are roughly two-thirds lower when a haven is listed, a pattern driven largely by multinationals. This suggests listing may reduce profit shifting as well as illicit flows. The pattern is more pronounced after Norway aligned its anti-money laundering rules with EU mandates, pointing to the value of combining unilateral and multilateral approaches.
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