Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:59am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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D11: Housing Inequality and Transaction Taxes Location: Room 112 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Transaction Taxes and Housing Inequality: Evidence from the UK Stamp Duty Holiday King's College London, United Kingdom This paper studies the United Kingdom's 2020-21 Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT) holiday, which unexpectedly eliminated tax liability for most transactions. Using universe-level administrative data on property transfers and SDLT receipts, combined with local-authority-level measures of exposure based on pre-reform price distributions, we implement a difference-in-differences event-study design. The holiday increased transactions by about 18 percent, with around 37 percent of the tax cut capitalized into higher prices. We estimate a fiscal cost of \pounds1.6 billion (25\% of revenue) during the relief period -- with no persistent effect once the policy expired. Distributional effects were regressive: upper-middle-income households (income deciles 7--9) captured net gains of around 10 percent of annual income, while first-time and lower-income buyers benefited only marginally. Linking transactions to buyer wealth, we show that SDLT operates as a de facto regressive wealth tax that falls disproportionately on younger, middle-wealth cohorts rather than on the wealthiest households.
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