Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:37:15am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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C02: Elasticity of Taxable Income and Tax Compliance Location: Room 102 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Third-party Monitoring and the Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evidence from an e-Register Reform 1: CUNEF University, Spain; 2: CERGE-EI, Czech Republic; 3: Charles University, Czech Republic We study how tax authority can manipulate the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) through tax monitoring. We build on a model of a trade-off between consumption and earned income subject to a kinked tax schedule, in which tax administration scales down the ETI through stricter tax enforcement. Using tax-return data on Czech self-employed individuals, we show that the ETI falls 30% in business sectors subject to real-time monitoring of business-to-customer sales via electronic sales registers. A down-scaled ETI permits increasing the revenue-maximizing top tax rate. The results support the optimal tax literature in which the ETI depends on tax environment.
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