Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:40:23am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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A14: Tax Compliance: Information and Simplicity Location: Room 116 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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The Price of Simplicity: Evidence from Norway’s Tax Scheme for Migrant Workers 1: University of Sao Paulo, Brazil; 2: Norwegian School of Economics (NHH), Norway This paper studies how administrative tax simplification affects tax burdens and behavior among recent migrants. We exploit Norway’s 2019 introduction of the Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) scheme, which allows eligible foreign workers to opt into a flat 25 percent withholding tax that eliminates filing requirements and deductions. Using population-wide administrative data and simulated counterfactual tax liabilities under the ordinary progressive system, we examine how PAYE reshapes effective tax rates and short-run outcomes. The reform strongly compresses the distribution of effective tax rates, generating a mass point at the statutory rate. This compression is asymmetric: many low- and middle-income migrants pay more under PAYE, increasing average effective tax rates by 2.25 percentage points. Because participation is voluntary, remaining in PAYE reveals a willingness to trade higher taxes for simplicity. A regression discontinuity design around the eligibility cutoff shows sharp tax differences but no short-run effects on employment, earnings, or migration outcomes.
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