Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:40:00am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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G02: Tariffs, Subsidies, and Industrial Policy in a Fragmented World Location: Room 102 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Tariff And Subsidy Policy In A Fragmented World: How To Respond To Cost Disadvantages And Spreading Protectionism ifo Institute for Economic Research, Germany In this paper we develop a stylized model of international trade and firm mobility to study how a country with cost disadvantages should design its tariff and subsidies policies in an increasingly fragmented world economy. We consider a setting with imperfect competition and strategic interaction between domestic and foreign firms, where there is room for using subsidies as well as tariffs to maximize national welfare. Firms are internationally mobile, but mobility is costly. If the rest of the world increases subsidies or tariffs, the optimal response generally depends on the specifics of the market under consideration, but in many cases it is nationally optimal to respond by reducing, not increasing domestic subsidies and tariffs.
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