Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
Please select a date to show only sessions at that day. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
Activate "Show Presentations" and enter your name in the search field in order to find your function (s), like presenter, discussant, chair.
Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:32am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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D05: Fairness Views and Fiscal Policy Preferences Location: Room 105 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Inequality, Efficiency, and Taxation: Understanding Fiscal Policy Preferences University of Barcelona - IEB, Spain This paper examines how voters balance inequality reduction, economic growth, and personal tax costs when evaluating fiscal policy. We implement a conjoint survey experiment with representative samples of about 2,000 respondents in each of Brazil, Spain, and the United States. Participants repeatedly chose between alternative policy packages that varied in income tax progressivity, tax revenue, spending composition, public debt or consumption taxes, and expected growth, allowing us to recover revealed preferences under realistic trade-offs. We find weak unconditional support for inequality reduction and stronger support for growth, but this pattern is largely explained by aversion to higher taxes. When policies are revenue-neutral, voters in all three countries show substantial support for redistribution. Individual self-interest reduces support when personal tax burdens rise, while acceptance increases when revenues fund valued purposes such as education, transfers, or debt reduction.
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