Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:38:04am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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F09: Digital Payments, Formalisation, and Tax Capacity in Brazil Location: Room 109 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Size-Based Business Taxation in a High-informality Context PUC-Rio, Brazil This paper provides new evidence on size-based taxation under low enforcement and pervasive informality, common in developing-country settings. I study Brazil’s introduction of a large-scale regime for micro-businesses below a revenue cutoff that replaced all business taxes with a low, fixed monthly fee, greatly simplifying compliance. Business creation proves highly responsive to tax liabilities: the reform increased the number of formal firms by 43%. This expansion is driven mainly by entrepreneurs moving from the informal sector, not by firms switching from other formal tax systems, implying gains in current tax revenue. The results show that targeted small-business regimes can promote formalization by focusing on firms most likely to remain informal. I also develop and estimate a model that clarifies the welfare trade-offs of fixed-fee taxation and identifies sufficient statistics for policy evaluation. The model indicates the reform raised welfare, mainly because it eliminated compliance costs rather than because it lowered taxes.
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