Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:39am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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C03: Digital Economy Taxation and International Tax Allocation Location: Room 103 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Reallocating Taxing Rights and Online Trade: Pillar One as a Partial Formula Apportionment 1: Erasmus School of Economics, Netherlands, The; 2: Gakushuin University, Japan; 3: Okayama University, Japan Targeting the problem of 'homeless profits' that digital firms earn in countries without a physical presence, OECD Pillar One aims to reallocate taxing rights to market countries based on the sales revenues of in-scope firms. This study theoretically investigates the implications of Pillar One by considering a global firm that conducts all its real activities in a tax haven and competes via prices in e-commerce with local firms in market countries. Our model identifies two core effects. First, all in-scope firms manipulate their routine profit threshold by increasing their total turnover. This reduces the reallocated tax base and crowds out the taxable profits of the local competitors. Second, for tax rate differentials, sales shifting emerges: the global firm increases prices in the high-tax country and books larger sales (and profits) in the low-tax country. Thus, the high-tax country suffers from lower tax revenue and greater market inefficiency, all else equal.
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