Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:38:27am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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F03: Tax Incentives for R&D and Innovation Location: Room 103 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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R&D Spillovers Through Buyer–Supplier Networks 1: Charles University, Czech Republic (Czechia); 2: Chiba University; 3: World Bank We study how R&D spillovers propagate through buyer–supplier networks, exploiting a major reform of Japan's R&D tax credit system in 2003. The reform replaced the incremental credit for large firms with a volume-based scheme, reducing the marginal cost of R&D for firms with eligible expenditure below a ceiling but not for those above it or for SMEs. Using difference-in-differences, we find the reform increased R&D expenditure, innovative output and sales of treated firms. We find evidence of positive forward spillovers to downstream firms: the reform raised productivity of firms with a greater share of treated suppliers. Conversely, we find no evidence of backward spillovers to upstream firms. Treated firms also reallocated R&D from overseas affiliates to Japan while expanding affiliate employment, suggesting that headquarters' innovation enabled scaling up of foreign production operations.
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