Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:37:43am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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G08: Labour Supply, Work Arrangements, and Employment Programmes Location: Room 108 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Demand for Employment Services in a Basic Income Experiment VATT Institute for Economic Research, Finland This study provides causal evidence on how unconditional income support affects engagement with employment services. We analyse the Finnish basic income experiment, which replaced minimum unemployment benefits with a guaranteed income for 2,000 randomly selected unemployed individuals and removed all job-search requirements while leaving the supply of public employment services unchanged. Using administrative registers, we find a 5–6 pp decline in employment plans, and a 9 pp reduction in active labour market programmes. The decline is concentrated in programmes targeting individuals with the weakest employment prospects, while sanctions for non-compliance increase. These estimates likely represent lower-bound effects, as many treated individuals continued to claim unemployment benefits and remained subject to job-search requirements.
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