Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:38:48am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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F03: Tax Incentives for R&D and Innovation Location: Room 103 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Tax Incentives For Innovation: The Differential Impact Across Innovation Types 1: University College Dublin, Skatteforsk: Norwegian Centre for Tax Research; 2: University College Dublin This paper studies the effects of tax incentives on firms’ choices between different types of innovation. We explore how the introduction of front-end (e.g., R&D tax credits) and back-end (e.g., patent boxes) tax incentives alter a firm’s optimal choice across product, process, or mixed innovation using a simple theoretical framework. We then provide empirical evidence on the heterogeneous effects of these tax instruments across innovation types using European Patent Office (EPO) data. Our empirical results suggest that the introduction of patent box regimes can lead to an increase in mixed patents applications at the expense of product patents. These findings help explain the growing prevalence of mixed patents observed over time and highlight that fiscal incentives can unintentionally distort firms’ innovation portfolios – encouraging certain innovation types while may induce underinvestment in others.
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