Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
Please select a date to show only sessions at that day. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
Activate "Show Presentations" and enter your name in the search field in order to find your function (s), like presenter, discussant, chair.
Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:37:43am WEST
|
Daily Overview |
| Session | |
|
C02: Elasticity of Taxable Income and Tax Compliance Location: Room 102 (Francesinhas 1) | |
    | |
Self-Financing Tax Cuts Around the World: New Theoretical Results and Applications to 33 Countries 1: LMU Munich; 2: University of Cologne, Germany This paper studies whether tax–transfer systems are inefficient in the sense that they allow for self-financing tax cuts. In the first part, we combine household microdata with tax–transfer calculators for 33 countries around the world. We show that, under standard labor supply elasticities, self-financing tax cuts exist in all 29 countries in which effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) exhibit sudden drops. In the second part, we show analytically that sudden drops in EMTRs give rise to inefficiencies whenever (a) taxpayers are rational with additively separable preferences, or (b) taxpayers use an ironing heuristic and EMTRs exceed a certain threshold. In the third part, we characterize discrete reforms that move tax–transfer systems to the Pareto frontier for both rational and non-rational taxpayers. Focusing on a model with isoelastic, quasi-linear preferences, we provide an empirically applicable recipe for designing tax reforms that raise revenue without making any individual in society worse off.
| |
