Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:33am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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G08: Labour Supply, Work Arrangements, and Employment Programmes Location: Room 108 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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The Impact of Short-Time Work Subsidies on Individual Employment Trajectories 1: ETH Zürich, Switzerland; 2: University of Bolzano We provide causal evidence on the effects of short-time work (STW) subsidies on individual short‑ and medium‑run labor market outcomes. Comparing workers in firms whose STW applications were approved to otherwise similar workers in firms whose applications were rejected, we find that access to STW leads to higher employment income and a reduced risk of unemployment. These effects, however, fade out in the second year after treatment. Around half of the employment income effect stems from the intensive margin of falling unemployed with the other half attributable to lower wages for workers with rejected STW applications. The unemployment‑reducing effect is concentrated among low‑income employees, whereas high‑income employees benefit primarily through improved earnings.
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