Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
Please select a date to show only sessions at that day. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
Activate "Show Presentations" and enter your name in the search field in order to find your function (s), like presenter, discussant, chair.
Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:40:23am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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G11: Fiscal Rules, Tax Expenditures, and Sovereign Risk Location: Room 112 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Cyclicality Of Tax Expenditures Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel This paper examines the cyclicality of tax expenditures, using panel data for both developed and developing economies. The analysis reveals that tax expenditures exhibit pronounced procyclicality in developing economies, whereas in developed economies they display a countercyclical pattern. These results are consistent with prior research on statutory tax and deficit adjustments across the business cycle. By using a stylized model, I show that observed behavior in developing economies is consistent with debt constraints; in particular, legitimate lagged report of tax expenditures in the formal budget, creates an incentive for non-transparent political maneuvering.
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