Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:38:27am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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F08: Optimal Taxation: Public Goods and Income Tax Design Location: Room 108 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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The Optimal Non-linear Income Tax Threshold Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel This paper examines the optimal income tax threshold, a topic that has received limited attention in existing literature. I show that the optimal non-linear tax threshold varies across income levels. Analysis of the social planner’s problem reveals that, as income rises, the optimal threshold is shaped by three forces: (i) a mechanical effect, whereby the threshold should be higher (lower) when a large share of individuals is located above (at) the relevant tax bracket; (ii) weaker income effects on labor supply, which push the threshold upward; and (iii) distributional considerations, which push the optimal threshold downward. Simulations calibrated with empirically plausible parameters indicate that the optimal threshold declines with income and becomes very low for high-income earners. I derive the optimal aggregate threshold implied by government optimization. I find that income tax thresholds in developed countries are higher than optimal for high-income earners and lower than optimal for the population as a whole.
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