Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:15am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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G10: Local Governance, Discretion, and Public Procurement Location: Room 110 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Can Discretion Rules in Public Spending Improve Government Performance? 1: National Center for State Courts (NCSC); 2: FGV Fundacao Getulio Vargas, Brazil; 3: FGV Fundacao Getulio Vargas, Brazil; 4: FGV Fundacao Getulio Vargas, Brazil; 5: FGV Fundacao Getulio Vargas, Brazil We exploit monetary thresholds in Brazil's Procurement Law that assign public contracts to procurement procedures with different degrees of formality and discretion. Combining administrative procurement records with independent audit evidence from the Office of the Comptroller-General (CGU), we implement a regression-discontinuity design using audit-based measures of corruption and procurement mismanagement. Rule tightening has no systematic effect on corruption across outcomes, procurement types, or municipality sizes. In contrast, stricter rules reduce procurement mismanagement in settings where procedural standardization is most likely to matter: the first threshold robustly lowers mismanagement in public works among smaller municipalities, while the second provides more qualified evidence of lower mismanagement in purchases. These effects tend to be stronger in smaller municipalities and less stable as larger municipalities are added to the sample, consistent with diminishing returns to formal rules as administrative capacity increases. Procurement regulation therefore appears to improve local-government performance primarily through administrative discipline rather than corruption deterrence.
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