Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
Please select a date to show only sessions at that day. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
Activate "Show Presentations" and enter your name in the search field in order to find your function (s), like presenter, discussant, chair.
Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:38:51am WEST
|
Daily Overview |
| Session | |
|
G08: Labour Supply, Work Arrangements, and Employment Programmes Location: Room 108 (Francesinhas 1) | |
    | |
How Capital-Labor Interactions Shape Minimum Wage Competition 1: Graduate School of Economics and Graduate School of Public Policy, University of Tokyo, Japan; 2: Business School, Hunan University, China This paper develops a two-region model of interjurisdictional minimum wage competition, demonstrating that such competition yields an inefficient minimum wage even in the absence of labor mobility. The inefficiency arises because mobile capital-whether technologically complementary to or substitutable for labor-drives strategic interaction across jurisdictions. The analysis yields two main findings. First, minimum wage competition unambiguously results in an equilibrium wage that falls short of the social optimum, irrespective of the nature of capital-labor technological interaction. Second, once capital taxation becomes an available policy instrument, the technological relationship between capital and labor determines whether the equilibrium minimum wage is excessive or insufficient.
| |
