Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:16am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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G03: Profit Shifting: Measurement and Real Responses Location: Room 103 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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5:22pm - 5:45pm
Hidden Related-Party Transactions and the Impact of Beneficial Ownership Transparency on Profit Shifting Charles University, Prague; Tax Justice Network Beneficial ownership (BO) registers make ultimate owners visible and raise the expected detection risk of intra-group payments routed through opaque ownership chains. Using confidential Czech firm-level country-by-country reporting and the staggered adoption of BO registers across jurisdictions, I estimate the effect of ownership transparency on within-multinational profit allocation. Heterogeneity-robust difference-in-differences estimates show that BO adoption modestly narrows downward profit misalignment: reported profits move closer to levels predicted by local employment, assets, and revenue. The effect concentrates among multinational-jurisdiction pairs with lower pre-reform exposure and fades within two years. The public-access split is null, consistent with a mechanism operating through expected authority detection rather than public exposure. Related-party transaction data corroborate a restructuring reading: BO reforms abroad bring extensive-margin entry of new firm-counterparty disclosure relationships, with little change within continuing pairs. The pattern suggests unilateral transparency reallocates rather than eliminates shifted profits, so durable benefits depend on the breadth of adoption.
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