Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:40:00am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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C06: Gender, Parental Leave, and the Child Penalty Location: Room 106 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Pay Transparency and the Gender Wage Gap: Evidence from Subnational Implementation Heterogeneity in Japan Boston University, United States of America Can “soft law” disclosure policies reduce gender wage inequality? This paper examines Japan’s 2022 pay transparency mandate, which requires firms with 301 or more employees to publicly disclose gender wage gaps under a soft-law regime without monetary penalties. Although the policy applies nationwide, compliance varied across prefectures due to differences in administrative guidance, generating subnational variation in disclosure intensity. Exploiting this variation as plausibly exogenous, I estimate the effects of disclosure using prefecture-by-industry-by-age aggregate data from the Basic Survey on Wage Structure within a fixed-effects framework. Higher disclosure rates reduced the gender wage gap in base pay by 0.046 log points, equivalent to 17.9 percent of the pre-policy gap. The gap narrowed through faster wage growth for women rather than male wage suppression, with effects concentrated in non-manufacturing industries. Overall, the results highlight the distributional effectiveness of information-based regulation operating through reputational incentives.
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